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In the course of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, the issue of asset valuation has regularly moved to center stage, 
due both to the sharp ﬂ  uctuations observed in numerous assets, making economic measurement difﬁ  cult, 
but also to the impact that ﬂ  uctuations can have on the behaviour of economic agents that are required to 
submit annual ﬁ  nancial statements –or even interim or quarterly ones. While this issue has not been seen 
as the cause of the latest crisis, it has nonetheless been considered as a potential source of its increasing 
magnitude, even though –at the time of this writing (early July)– we have not yet seen any massive sell-offs 
of major asset classes (equities or bonds, corporate issues in particular).
The question of asset and liability valuation is of particular concern for the insurance industry. Because of the 
speciﬁ  c characteristics of this industry, valuation poses speciﬁ  c problems which, far from being fully different 
compared to the other sectors –the banking industry in particular– in fact tend to be magniﬁ  ed. In fact,
it is no accident that the only sector to be granted a transition regime in the application of new international 
accounting standards is the insurance industry, due to difﬁ  culties encountered by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in ﬁ  nding a workable solution for the valuation of insurance liabilities. 
Similarly, it is no accident that the Internet meltdown was suddenly aggravated in 2002-2003 by the massive 
move on the part of insurance and reinsurance companies to liquidate their equity portfolios when, once
a certain downward price threshold had been surpassed, they decided it was time to sell rather than 
face the consequences of further depreciation in equity prices on their balance sheets and their 
solvency margins. The memory of this last event, which without any warning whatsoever took on the 
proportions of a systemic risk for the global ﬁ  nancial sector, recently came to mind when the fall in equity 
prices picked up speed globally in light of soaring oil prices and an uptick in inﬂ  ation. Accordingly, the 
issue of insurance asset and liability valuation does not just pose a microeconomic problem in terms
of assessing the ﬁ  nancial strength of insurance and reinsurance companies. It also poses a macroeconomic 
problem in terms of ﬁ  nancing the economy and ensuring ﬁ  nancial stability.
In the rest of this article, we will examine the economic problems posed by the valuation of insurance and 
reinsurance assets and liabilities. Then, we will analyse the relevance of today’s competing accounting 
standards, concluding that they offer a very imperfect resolution to the challenges of insurance valuation. 
Finally, we will analyse the consequences of these problems for ﬁ  nancial stability –in terms of the solvency 
of companies, the ﬁ  nancing of the economy, and the ability to absorb shocks to the system. We will conclude 
that they are signiﬁ  cantly greater than is often imagined.ARTICLES
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1| THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
  POSED BY VALUATION
  IN INSURANCE
Insurance poses very speciﬁ  c valuation challenges, 
on both the asset and liability sides of the balance 
sheet. These problems are related to the very nature 
of insurance liabilities. In fact, these liabilities are 
simultaneously partially virtual, long-tail, illiquid 
and sub-additive (which means that the value
of a portfolio of insurance liabilities is less than 
the sum of its individual liabilities). This being so, 
they accumulate all of the valuation challenges that 
are found individually in other economic activities
or transactions.
1|1 The  virtual  nature
  of most insurance
  and reinsurance liabilities
Insurance liabilities measure the value of the 
obligations that insurers and reinsurers have 
with respect to their insureds. Since insurance 
compensates for insured losses, the insurance 
obligation concerns the promise to indemnify the 
insured in the event that the risk against which the 
latter is insured comes to pass. As soon as a covered 
loss occurs, the insured has a claim on the insurer, 
obliging the latter to provide compensation under 
the terms and conditions of the contract. In this 
particular case, things are fairly straightforward: 
the value of the insurer’s obligation is equal to the 
cost of indemnifying the loss under the terms of the 
contract. The real problem lies not in this point but 
in estimating the value of the insurer’s obligations 
to policyholders who have not yet suffered an 
insured loss but who could do so during the period 
that separates them from the end of the policy. The 
question is all the more relevant considering that the 
insurer knows, from experience, that between now 
and the end of the contracts in force, a good number of 
its policyholders will have sustained an insured loss, 
such as an auto accident or a health-related mishap. 
How can the value of this obligation be measured? 
For one thing, it is purely virtual. And its value is nil 
because the insured cannot record a receivable from 
or a claim on the insurer on its balance sheet as the 
counterpart of the debt the insurer has with respect 
to the policyholder. Moreover, statistical laws tell 
us that when a policy reaches its term, the value of 
these obligations will not be nil, that certain risks will 
come to pass, and that we can –without waiting for 
the policies to expire– arrive at an estimated value
of these obligations based on serious probability.
In general, insurance accounting considers that 
the value of the obligation is nil as long as the risk 
does not occur and therefore has not created any 
objective right to indemniﬁ  cation. This hypothesis 
has no signiﬁ  cant implications for the valuation 
of the obligations of insurers and reinsurers,
as long as the value of the liabilities arising from the 
occurrence of new insured losses is approximately 
equivalent to the value of the obligations discharged 
via the liquidation of the payout for past losses.
This hypothesis surely becomes questionable in 
the case of a natural or technological catastrophe or 
an act of large-scale terrorism. This is why certain 
accounting standards continue to allow insurers 
and reinsurers to set aside so-called equalisation 
reserves, which are intended to cover events which 
have not yet occurred but which, if they were to 
occur, would probably be particularly costly.
Life insurance, when we focus on the savings aspect
which represents more than 80% of the insurance 
turnover, poses a particular problem, since it creates 
entitlements that accumulate over the life of the 
contract, in the form of interest on the principal 
and a guarantee on the value of the capital that is 
accumulated, with the right to surrender the contract 
(or exit from the contract) as soon as it is initialised 
in the event of death. How can we measure the 
value of this obligation? For one thing, only interest 
(investment returns) already paid and the capital 
actually acquired generate an objective claim on the 
part of the insured beneﬁ  ciary, which the latter can 
mobilise at will under the redemption or surrender 
option that most contracts of this type offer.
In addition, if the policyholder does not exercise this 
right of redemption prior to the end of the contract 
–and it is rarely done– the interest that the insured 
will earn and the value of the capital he or she will 
accumulate under the contract can be estimated 
with a relative degree of precision using stochastic 
ﬁ  nancial techniques, even though these beneﬁ  ts 
are only virtual at the time they are estimated. 
Under normal circumstances, the two valuations 
show little tendency to diverge. Conversely, in 
crisis situations –in particular ﬁ  nancial  crisis–ARTICLES
Philippe Trainar: “Valuation in insurance and ﬁ  nancial crisis”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 12 – Valuation and ﬁ  nancial stability ￿ October 2008  103
they have a tendency to diverge signiﬁ  cantly, giving 
very different pictures of the ﬁ  nancial position of 
life insurers, just when they most need to have a 
failsafe valuation. However, it should be stressed 
that this problem is not, strictly speaking, speciﬁ  c 
to insurance, and arises in other ﬁ  nancial sectors as 
well, whenever it is necessary to estimate the value 
of assets like equities, whose future ﬂ  ows are virtual 
and uncertain.
1|2  The long-tail nature of insurance
  and reinsurance liabilities
Insurance and reinsurance liabilities typically 
have long-term horizons, much longer than bank 
liabilities. There are two speciﬁ  c reasons for this. 
For one thing, the viscosity of insurance liabilities 
is high: while demand deposits made with banks 
can be withdrawn immediately by clients with no 
penalty whatsoever, property-casualty insurance 
policies cannot be redeemed. In addition, they are 
renewed almost automatically by tacit agreement. 
Similarly, annuity payments cannot be advanced 
over time at the behest of the beneﬁ  ciary; as for 
life insurance policies, they cannot be redeemed by 
insureds without being subject to contractual and tax 
penalties, within deadlines that can be measured in 
months rather than hours. Secondly, the liabilities 
of insurers are long-tail: the payment of annuities 
is spread over several decades. The duration of a 
life insurance policy is typically ﬁ  ve to six years, 
including the redemption option (excluding the 
redemption option, the term is typically ten to ﬁ  fteen 
years). Because claims settlement never comes 
just after a loss, even in the case of truly serious 
losses like the World Trade Center, for example, 
due to procedures of control and even recourse, 
which safeguard the interests of all stakeholders, in 
particular other policyholders, non-life insurance is 
structurally in a positive cash ﬂ  ow situation.
While the valuation of viscous liabilities is 
probably less uncertain than for other liabilities 
due to the lower or even nonexistent weight of 
redemption/surrender options (which constitute 
one of the most difﬁ  cult elements to measure with 
certainty), the valuation of long-term liabilities 
and assets is much more difﬁ  cult than that of
short-term liabilities. First of all, it is more complex 
because it depends on a far greater number of 
parameters than the valuation of short-term 
liabilities. Secondly, it is more uncertain because 
it also depends on possible changes in trends and 
in behaviours that are cumulative and which can’t 
be modelised as a simple random variable. This 
is true in particular with respect to the payout 
of annuities, pensions and long-term care, for 
which the horizon can be measured in decades, as 
opposed to health, auto, homeowners and natural 
catastrophes, for which the horizon is annual. 
But the main problem with long-term liabilities 
is related not to their valuation but rather to the 
valuation of the assets that are intended to match 
these long-term liabilities. Since the value of assets 
has a tendency to ﬂ  uctuate over time, and given 
that both insurers and reinsurers are –because of 
the viscosity and duration of their liabilities– able 
to hang on to a portfolio of impaired assets as long 
as it has a reasonable chance of recovering its full 
value over a time frame that corresponds to their 
obligations, measuring the snapshot value of assets 
may not be the best way to evaluate the coverage 
that these assets offer for the liabilities. The question 
is all the more legitimate in that recent ﬁ  nancial 
analysis has amply demonstrated, on the basis of 
available empirical data spanning a century, that 
both the historic value of assets and their market 
value are very bad “predictors” of their future value, 
particularly of their value when the time comes to 
cover the obligations they have to policyholders 
and pay the latter. In any case, in terms of actuarial 
expectation, holding on to a temporarily impaired 
portfolio of assets is a very proﬁ  table operation for 
insurers and reinsurers because it allows them to 
pocket the risk premium that is attributable to the
short-term volatility of assets, without this volatility 
having an impact on their ability to satisfy their 
long-term commitments. 
Admittedly, it can be claimed –and rightly so– that 
the future value of an asset is too uncertain to be 
used for the purpose of accounting or prudential 
valuation, and that the hypothesis of a future 
random and unforeseeable outcome only serves 
to integrate the conservatism that is the hallmark 
of both accounting and prudential standards. 
Conversely, while this is true when we look at 
values individually, it is less so when our level 
of analysis is portfolios of well-diversiﬁ  ed assets. 
Financial econometrics has revealed signiﬁ  cant 
regression to the mean behaviours for equities, 
and divergence with respect to the mean for bonds,ARTICLES
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in the industrialised countries.1 The chart below, 
which compares the effective volatility of the 
CAC 40 and government bonds since 1950 based 
on their holding horizon to the volatility that they 
would have if we assumed these assets had followed 
the random walk of a Brownian variable, clearly 
illustrates these behaviours. And naturally, these are 
fundamental for determining the structure of optimal 
asset portfolios intended to cover the obligations of 
insurance and reinsurance companies. The most 
recent generations of internal models increasingly 
integrate these divergence and convergence 
behaviour.2 So long-tail insurance liabilities pose a 
very serious valuation problem for the assets that 
match these liabilities. This problem was ignored 
for too long, primarily for theoretical reasons: the 
dominant ﬁ  nancial theory of the nineteen seventies 
and eighties considered that markets were totally 
efﬁ   cient, that they incorporated all relevant 
information available at a given point in time, and 
that it was therefore impossible to ﬁ  nd a better 
measurement of asset values than that provided 
by the markets. There were also practical reasons: 
even if not all assets followed a random walk, it was 
nonetheless difﬁ  cult to arrive at a consensus over 
an acceptable alternative model. This is not true 
today thanks to recent developments in behavioural 
ﬁ  nance. The bubble that formed and then burst 
around Internet stocks put the subject back on 
center stage, since the most successful insurance 
and reinsurance companies in the aftermath were 
those that were not required by their supervisors 
–which were late adopters of the efﬁ  cient markets 
theory– to unload their equity investments when 
prices troughed between 2002 and 2003.
1|3 The  illiquid  nature
  of most insurance
  and reinsurance liabilities
Strictly speaking, there is no real secondary market 
for insurance liabilities. Insurance contracts do 
not generally change hands after they are written. 
There are several reasons for this, which have to 
do both with the nature of insurance contracts and 
insurance regulation. The often long horizon of 
insurance obligations and their largely virtual nature 
make valuation difﬁ  cult and uncertain, as we have 
already seen. Moreover, we need to consider the
multi-dimensionality of insurance risks: ﬁ  nancial 
risks most often can be collapsed into a single 
dimension (the interest rate risk, for example), 
even if this dimension may itself synthesise several 
dimensions upstream (a spread risk and an interest 
rate risk, for example). On the contrary, insurance 
risks always and immediately have several 
dimensions (in a policy as simple as auto insurance, 
coverage can be triggered by a multitude of different 
events), and their import is therefore more difﬁ  cult 
to grasp analytically. In insurance, much more than 
in ﬁ  nance, it is difﬁ  cult to have an ex ante vision
of the outcome of contracts. This complexity 
makes insurance risks difﬁ  cult for outside parties 
to manage. But, above all, it constitutes very fertile 
ground for the appearance of moral hazard issues, 
due to the strong degree of information asymmetry 
that it creates in favor of the underwriting insurer 
or reinsurer.
This situation, which is understandably not 
supportive of the emergence of a secondary market 
for insurance risks, has been aggravated further 
1  See Gollier (2008).
2  “Reinsurance and the Swiss solvency test”, M. Dacorogna ed., SCOR Studies, 2008.
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still by regulation which, in every country, places 
strict limits on the conditions under which the 
ownership of insurance and reinsurance portfolios 
can be transferred, based on the principle that the 
underwriting insurer or reinsurer must maintain 
responsibility for it until all of the rights and duties 
it has created have been performed and have 
expired. This framework is motivated by the desire 
to protect the consumer against any deterioration 
in the security of his or her policy in the event of 
a transfer. Consequently, a portfolio of insurance 
contracts cannot be transferred to another licensed 
insurer until a long and cumbersome process
has been completed and pending the prior approval 
of the relevant regulators. As a result, portfolio 
trades and transfers are exceptional, and mainly 
involve companies whose business license has 
been withdrawn by regulators, or those that have 
been taken over or aligned themselves with other 
companies to merge operations within a mutual 
framework. As such, they cannot in any way 
serve as a market benchmark for the valuation of 
insurance risks.
Things are different for insurance liabilities 
securitisation, which offers far more interesting 
prospects for establishing a market benchmark. In 
spite of its rapid growth in the course of the last 
ten years, the insurance securitisation market 
nonetheless remains small in both absolute and 
relative terms. At year-end 2007, it was valued at 
USD 38 billion, compared with USD 11.7 trillion for 
the asset-backed securities (ABSs) market. The depth 
and liquidity of the insurance securitisation market 
are not totally established at this time, especially 
since the term covers a set of very different products 
ranging from cat bonds, which cover insurance risks 
exclusively, to securitisation of embedded value, 
which covers risks that are essentially ﬁ  nancial 
in nature, not to mention the securitisation of 
mortality, auto and other risks, which often seek 
to leverage regulatory trade-offs. A reﬂ  ection of the 
limited depth and liquidity of this market, the rates 
that are established hardly resolve the uncertainties 
surrounding the valuation of insurance liabilities. 
Accordingly, cat bond rates ﬂ  uctuate as broadly as 
or more so than reinsurance rates. So securitisation 
does not at this stage qualify as an incontestable 
market benchmark for insurance liabilities.
1|4 The  sub-additive  nature
 of  insurance
  and reinsurance liabilities
At the foundation of insurance and reinsurance, we 
ﬁ  nd the logic of diversiﬁ  cation and pooling. This 
logic governs the constitution of good portfolios: 
insofar as possible, they must associate risks that 
are independent of one another –in the sense that 
the insured population has independent behaviours, 
that the risks covered are different, or that the 
geographic regions covered are distinct. The term 
pooling is often reserved for the underwriting of a 
single risk for a large number of insureds, whom 
we suppose are more or less independent of one 
another. Conversely, the term diversiﬁ  cation  is 
used for underwriting different risks in different 
countries. Market competition should push for the 
elimination of all of the diversiﬁ  able or poolable risk 
by insurers and reinsurers, such that insureds are 
left with only those risks that are not diversiﬁ  able. 
If the diversiﬁ   able risk is eliminated, then the 
corresponding risk premium should also be cancelled 
out, and the valuation of insurance and reinsurance 
liabilities should no longer cover anything but 
the actuarial expectation of the cost of the risk, 
plus the risk premium that corresponds to the
non diversiﬁ  able risk, which is transferred to the 
insurer or the reinsurer. This being the case, the 
value of these liabilities as carried by insurers or 
reinsurers must be lower than the value of these 
same liabilities for insureds, with the gap between 
the two corresponding to the diversiﬁ  able  risk 
premium. However, since markets are imperfect, 
the diversiﬁ  able risk is not totally eliminated by 
competition, and the value of one and the same 
insurance or reinsurance liability can change from 
one insurer or reinsurer to the next depending on 
the quality of its diversiﬁ  cation and pooling.
But to successfully factor these beneﬁ  ts  of 
diversiﬁ  cation or of pooling into the valuation of 
insurance liabilities, the approach must be based 
not on individual contracts but rather on portfolios 
of contracts or on an entity-by-entity basis. It is only 
at this level that the effects of diversiﬁ  cation and 
pooling are perceptible. However, by measuring the 
value of insurance liabilities at these aggregate levels, ARTICLES
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we run the risk of over-estimating the decorrelation 
between insureds, between lines of business, and 
between geographic regions, particularly in extreme 
situations, which as a reminder generally are the 
result of a recorrelation of risks that are habitually 
decorrelated. This is one of the classic causes of 
the under-estimation of insurance and reinsurance 
liabilities. On the contrary, by failing to measure the 
value of insurance liabilities at a sufﬁ  ciently aggregate 
level, we encourage insurers and reinsurers to make 
tradeoffs based on regulatory considerations, and 
transfer the risks they have written to other economic 
agents that are not or are less regulated, knowing 
that the market price of this risk transfer will mostly 
take into account the extent to which the portfolio is 
pooled and diversiﬁ  ed, as estimated on the date of the 
transaction.3 Some might consider that this situation 
would not necessarily be bad for the industry, since 
the market will have enabled the emergence of an 
objective value for the risk. Independently of the 
subjective perception of the entities involved, it 
would be possible to refer to it when assessing the 
values of the corresponding insurance liabilities. 
In fact, even if the insurance securitisation market 
were sufﬁ  ciently deep and liquid, this would hardly 
be possible, since the effects of diversiﬁ  cation are 
speciﬁ  c to each transferred portfolio and, as such, do 
not constitute a solid basis for measuring the value 
of the effects of diversiﬁ  cation included in portfolios 
that have not been transferred. 
2| THE LIMITED RELEVANCE OF
  EXISTING ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
As we have seen, it is not these problems taken 
individually but rather their concatenation that 
makes it hard to estimate the value of the liabilities 
and assets of insurance or reinsurance companies. In 
other words, no accounting solution to date has been 
able to offer a satisfactory solution to this problem 
set as a whole. All of the accounting standards 
contemplated up to now must be viewed as very 
imperfect with respect to this point, whether it is 
the historic cost standard, the fair value standard, 
or hybrid standards. In a universe that would 
correspond to static economic models, such as
the Arrow-Debreu model, where institutions play no 
role, these differences and imperfections would be
of no consequence since economic agents are 
presumed to be capable of understanding the
economic reality that lies behind the accounting 
veil. More radically, in a universe where the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies, these differences 
disappear because the value of the ﬁ  rm must be 
the same regardless of how it is ﬁ  nanced and the 
accounting standard it uses. Conversely, behavioural 
ﬁ  nance attaches a great deal of importance to these 
imperfections, to the biases that they introduce into 
the valuation process, and to the market inefﬁ  ciencies 
they are capable of introducing. The aim of this section 
is not to present the various accounting standards, but 
rather to analyse the relevance of the solution these 
standards offer in light of the problems raised in the 
valuation of insurance assets and liabilities, as well as 
their impacts on the behaviour of economic agents.
2|1 The  imperfection
  of historic cost accounting
Under historic cost accounting, which is still the 
method of choice for most local standards, assets 
and liabilities are measured at their entry cost 
or their amortised cost. It offers a great deal of 
stability for balance sheet carrying values, since 
these values only evolve on the basis of changes in 
the entitlements or claims of companies or clients. 
Insurers and reinsurers have mostly been fervent 
supporters of this method, which ensures a great 
deal of stability in their balance sheets and amortises 
economic and ﬁ  nancial shocks (both upside and 
downside). As a result, this method is viewed as a 
source of conservatism: ﬂ  uctuations in capital gains 
and losses neither inﬂ  ate nor deﬂ  ate the earnings 
or net assets of the company. Immunised against 
short-term ﬂ  uctuations, the insurer or reinsurer can 
deﬁ  ne a long-term strategy and stick to it for as long 
as its solvency is not affected. However, the historic 
cost standard does not in any way resolve any of the 
valuation problems we have identiﬁ  ed:
￿ the effects of diversiﬁ  cation and pooling between 
the contracts of a single portfolio and between the 
different portfolios of a single entity are not taken 
3  As a reminder, without the permission of the supervisory authorities, only the ﬁ  nancial hedge can be transferred in insurance. The corresponding risks remain, 
conversely, on the balance sheet of the company that originally wrote them.ARTICLES
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into account, for reasons of conservatism that we 
ﬁ  nd in all historical cost accounting in insurance;
￿ virtual liabilities are partially treated within the 
context of the equalisation reserve, which anticipates 
the cost of extreme events while leaving a great deal 
of latitude for determining the exact amount for 
individual companies;
￿ as for long-tail and illiquid liabilities or assets, 
they are measured on the basis of the price of 
the transaction that introduced these liabilities or 
these assets into the balance sheet; they therefore 
lose all relationship to the underlying economic 
and ﬁ  nancial reality after the insurance contract 
is initialised.
The solution brought to these valuation problems 
by historic cost accounting can be summed up as 
not worrying about them and focusing instead on 
the accounting treatment of their consequences
–i.e., calculating the solvency of companies and 
measuring their ability to honor their commitments 
when the time comes to do so. In other words, the 
counterpart of this simplistic negation of valuation 
problems is a sophisticated analysis of solvency.
As in the universe corresponding to the Arrow-Debreu
model, insurers and reinsurers are presumed 
not to let themselves be taken in by the values 
written on the balance sheet, whose only function 
is to give stakeholders –most often assimilated to 
supervisors– a conservative assessment of the solvency 
of companies over a long-term perspective.
But the Arrow-Debreu model is purely static, whereas 
insurers and reinsurers operate in a dynamic world 
where a certain degree of accounting illusion 
prevails (as empirical observation conﬁ  rms). The 
principal limitation of historic cost accounting is that 
it renders the balance sheet valuation insensitive 
to new signals given by the market price system. 
For insurers and reinsurers, this insensitivity affects 
the valuation of assets more than that of liabilities, 
which contains speciﬁ  c mechanisms intended to 
incorporate the most recent signals from the market, 
such as discounting annuities, correcting reserves for 
inﬂ  ation, etc. For this reason, historic cost accounting 
introduces a strong incentive to sell assets that have 
undergone the most appreciation recently, generally 
when the cycle peaks.4 This incentive is that much 
stronger since the assets in question show marked 
regression to the mean behaviour. The effects of 
this behaviour are naturally felt beyond insurance 
and reinsurance: it impacts the capital markets by 
improving their efﬁ  ciency.
2|2 The  imperfection
  of fair value accounting
Fair value accounting, which has recently been 
adopted in many countries, notably in Europe, for 
consolidated ﬁ  nancial statement reporting, seeks to 
correct the insensitivity of historic cost accounting 
to new information from the market. In an ideal 
world, fair value is tantamount to market value, 
since it is the best available value when markets 
are functioning efﬁ  ciently. The value of most of 
the assets of insurance and reinsurance companies 
is measured in this way. However, not every asset 
and liability has a market value that integrates, at all 
times, the most recent information made available 
by the market. This is true in particular of insurance 
liabilities, as we have seen. Hence the need to deﬁ  ne 
an ad hoc fair value that is able, insofar as possible, 
to replicate what the market value of these liabilities 
would have been if they had been exchanged in 
an efﬁ  cient market. After numerous discussions 
within the IASB, it seems that a consensus has been 
reached on measuring the value of these liabilities 
based on their current exit value, i.e., the value they 
would have today if they were to be transferred to 
another insurer. This current exit value of insurance 
liabilities is comprised, according to the IASB, 
of three elements: the best estimate or actuarial 
expectation of the cost of the risks underwritten, 
plus a margin that the market requires to assume 
an uncertain debt (the risk margin), and another 
that the market requires to provide other services 
to insureds (the service margin). In other words, this 
is an appraised value.
Without discussing this accounting standard and the 
criticisms it has generated in great detail, notably 
those concerning the service margin,5 it is necessary 
to stress that fair value, while it introduces market 
discipline, nonetheless only very imperfectly 
4  See Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2007).
5  See Duverne and Ledouit (2008).ARTICLES
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resolves the problems raised by the valuation
of insurance liabilities and assets:
￿ the effects of diversiﬁ  cation and pooling between 
contracts can be taken into account at the level of 
each homogenous portfolio of contracts, but not 
between the various portfolios of a single entity. The 
IASB is hostile to any measurement of liabilities that 
is dependent on the entity that manages them;
￿ virtual liabilities are largely excluded from the 
scope of the fair value accounting for the obligations 
of insurers and reinsurers, and wind up within 
the scope of the company’s capital and net assets,
which are intended to absorb shocks that are not 
easy to anticipate or that simply have not been;
￿ long-tail or illiquid liabilities, which are by nature 
difﬁ  cult to match, are measured at their current 
exit value, whose forecasting dimension makes it 
necessary to take all new information into account;
￿ concerning the particular case of assets covering 
liabilities, Japan introduced assets of a fourth type 
–those held to cover insurance contract obligations 
and valued at their amortised cost, but the IASB has 
not, and the links between the valuation of insurance 
assets and insurance liabilities in IAS standards only 
transits via the discounting of liabilities using the 
risk-free rate. 
By choosing market value for the principal assets 
of insurers and reinsurers, fair value introduces 
signiﬁ  cant volatility into their valuation, without 
including the equivalent at the level of liabilities, 
the valuation of which is –by design rather than 
by nature– less volatile, since it is based on an 
appraised ﬁ  nancial value that is by deﬁ  nition much 
more stable than market values. In addition, to the 
extent that the liabilities of insurers and reinsurers 
are long, the reference to fair value and market 
value for the valuation of assets introduces artiﬁ  cial 
volatility into the prices of the value of the net 
assets. This is particularly true during periods of 
crisis, when asset prices no longer reﬂ  ect future 
proﬁ  ts although liquidity constraints may affect 
the economy and the company in the short run.6 
This artiﬁ  cial volatility is aggravated by the fact 
that fair value offers a strong incentive to sell those 
assets that have depreciated the most recently, 
in general when the cycle troughs.7 The effects of 
this distortion can well spread beyond insurance 
and reinsurance and into the capital markets,
where they reduce efﬁ  ciency.
2|3 The  imperfection
  of hybrid standards
In practice, accounting systems are not as pure as
we have imagined them to be above. They incorporate 
a healthy dose of pragmatism, the purpose of which 
is to allow them to adapt to reality. Accordingly, 
historic cost accounting integrates an impairment 
mechanism that is used to improve the measurement 
of long-term assets by allowing the depreciation of 
those assets whose value slips below the entry value 
on the balance sheet for a period that exceeds the 
deﬁ  nition of temporary. However, if guaranteeing 
that impairments are sufﬁ  ciently objective requires 
assessing the other than temporary nature of the 
depreciation using criteria that reproduce the 
workings of the market, then we ﬁ  nd ourselves once 
again in a situation where the accounting method 
is that of historic cost accounting whenever assets 
appreciate, and in a fair value situation whenever 
the value of assets is impaired on an other than 
temporary basis. In fact, far from having reduced the 
inefﬁ  ciencies of historic cost accounting, this way of 
calculating impairments leads to an accumulation 
of the inefﬁ   ciencies of fair value accounting, 
which encourages insurers and reinsurers to sell 
assets whose price has fallen, independently of 
their prospects for recovery, with those of historic 
cost accounting, which encourages them to sell 
those assets whose price has risen independently.7
To avoid this, it would be necessary to calculate 
impairments on the basis of a discount rate for 
future cash ﬂ  ows that is speciﬁ  c to each insurer 
or reinsurer, at a price that is nonetheless more 
subjective in terms of assessing the other than 
temporary nature of the depreciation.7
Similarly, fair value accounting has developed, 
as a transition measure, a hybrid standard known 
as International Financial Reporting Standards 4
Phase I (IFRS 4 Phase I) for insurance and 
reinsurance while awaiting the deﬁ  nition of a 
permanent standard that is more appropriate 
6  See Allen and Carletti (2006).
7  See Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2007).ARTICLES
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(known as IFRS 4 Phase II). This standard, which 
is inspired by the US GAAP solution, in practice 
blends the existing IAS and IFRS standards and 
local standards. Schematically speaking, assets 
are measured at their fair value, while liabilities 
are valued at their historic cost. It is immediately 
clear that this transition standard poses a major 
problem in that it applies two different accounting 
philosophies to assets and liabilities, with the 
risk of generating, at the level of net assets for 
insurance and reinsurance companies, substantial 
artiﬁ  cial volatility that is the pure product of a 
hybrid accounting convention and, as such, is 
unrelated to any underlying economic and ﬁ  nancial 
reality whatsoever. In an attempt to reduce 
this risk, the IASB added a speciﬁ  c mechanism 
inspired directly by US GAAP, the  notion of 
“shadow accounting”, which allows to us take into 
account the fact that changes in net assets may 
be passed on to policyholders via proﬁ  t-sharing
mechanisms, for example, and to thereby link 
liabilities to assets when this is necessary. But 
given the difﬁ  culty of deﬁ  ning this link precisely, 
the IASB opted to remain relatively general in its 
wording on shadow accounting, leaving the door 
wide open to a high degree of heterogeneity at 
the level of market practice, even if domestic 
auditors and accounting standard boards have 
imposed a minimum of standardisation. Above 
all, since shadow accounting deals with only one 
aspect of insurance and reinsurance asset/liability 
matching, the hybrid standard of Phase I still 
contains a serious risk of artiﬁ  cial volatility in the 
net assets of companies.
Overall, and in light of the speciﬁ  c valuation issues 
that insurance and reinsurance companies face, the 
hybrid standards are hardly more effective than the 
pure standards, despite their stated aim of better 
taking the industry’s concerns into account.
3| FINANCIAL STABILITY
  AND INSURANCE VALUATION
Often neglected, issues related to insurance 
valuation nonetheless are located at the heart
of many problems of ﬁ  nancial stability. Admittedly, 
insurance and reinsurance companies have virtually 
never solicited public ﬁ  nances or monetary policy 
in crisis situations. The case of Japan is emblematic 
in this respect: while the difﬁ  culties encountered 
by the banks in the 1990’s mobilised both monetary 
policy and public ﬁ  nances, insurers have experienced 
numerous bankruptcies without beneﬁ  ting
from any public support whatsoever, even though 
the responsibility for many of these failures can be 
attributed to competition from a postal company 
that is supported by public ﬁ  nances. The stakes in 
terms of ﬁ  nancial stability are not limited to the 
solvency of insurance and reinsurance companies, 
and also touch the ﬁ   nancing of the economy
and the ability of the latter to absorb signiﬁ  cant 
ﬁ  nancial shocks.
3|1 Supervising  insurance
  and reinsurance company solvency
In insurance and reinsurance, as in banking, the 
supervision of solvency is based on compliance 
with certain deﬁ   ned capital ratios, with capital 
understood in the large sense –liabilities that can 
withstand stresses, shocks and unforeseen losses. 
The measurement of solvency naturally depends 
on the valuation of insurance assets and liabilities, 
to the extent that the net worth of the company 
constitutes the principal constitutive element of 
solvency. With respect to the issue of solvency 
supervision, current exit value probably constitutes 
one of the most interesting innovations in the 
area of fair value accounting. Indeed, current exit 
value corresponds pretty well to the economic 
measurement of the obligations of insurers and 
reinsurers, which is what supervisors need to be 
paying attention to. The Solvency II reform, which is 
currently under discussion at the European level, has 
integrated current exit value into its standards for the 
valuation of insurance and reinsurance obligations.
The stability of value measurements made using the 
historic cost method, or the amortised cost method, 
has barely any economic signiﬁ  cance for solvency. 
It requires integrating an additional prudential 
margin into the solvency margin calculation and, to 
support this aim, setting the margin at a comfortable 
enough level to absorb not only a new stress but 
also the earlier adverse deviation in the underlying 
values. In fact, when company ﬁ  nancial statements 
are presented using the historic cost accounting 
method, it is generally the case that the ﬁ  nancial ARTICLES
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position of the companies whose license has been 
withdrawn by regulators must be drastically revised 
downward without being able to attribute the earlier 
over-estimation of its position to fraud.
In the same manner, ﬂ  uctuations in market value 
are not particularly relevant to the supervision 
of insurance and reinsurance company solvency, 
insofar as they do not correspond to an irreversible 
impairment in an underlying trend in the 
valuation of this or that balance sheet line item. 
The relatively long timeframe of insurance and 
reinsurance, as well as the viscosity of insurance and 
reinsurance company balance sheets, still allows 
for the contemplation of a later correction for these 
ﬂ  uctuations as long as the company is solvent hic et 
nunc. It is important to understand the argument: 
by anticipating a correction of this kind, we are 
not being imprudent; we are doing no more than 
engaging in asset/liability management designed to 
optimise the social gains and economic well-being. 
Hence, we authorise inter-temporal pooling, which 
is one of the fundamental aspects of pooling itself.
Supervisors should therefore be wary of both historic 
values and market values, and should refer insofar 
as possible to other valuations and other hypotheses. 
Above all, the combination of assets at market value 
and liabilities at current exit value carries the risk 
of an artiﬁ  cial volatility in net worth compared 
with the real ﬁ  nancial wealth of the enterprise. 
To attenuate the adverse consequences of this 
artiﬁ  cial volatility, the solvency margin should be 
able to function as a shock absorber under these 
circumstances –naturally, under the supervision 
of the relevant authorities. This is how prudential 
standards can play an important corrective role 
with respect to the imperfections of accounting. 
In fact, it is neither desirable nor possible to obtain 
accounting standards that suit the speciﬁ  cities of 
insurance and reinsurance while also ensuring 
the comparability of their earnings with those of 
other economic sectors. Conversely, it is part of 
the exclusive mission of prudential regulation and 
supervision to stick close to the reality of the industry.
We can see the beginnings of a distribution of roles, 
with accounting standards more speciﬁ  cally  in 
charge of comparability and prudential standards 
in charge of dealing with the speciﬁ  c features of 
insurance and reinsurance.
In this vein, the effects of risk pooling and 
diversiﬁ  cation should be taken into account by the 
prudential standards, much like Solvency II reform 
does, insofar as they cannot be by the accounting 
standards. If this limitation of accounting standards 
were not corrected for by the prudential standards, 
companies would be encouraged not to conserve 
risks in their balance sheet and would instead seek 
to transfer them insofar as possible to other, non-
regulated agents. The market values of risks that 
would result would be for this reason partially 
inefﬁ  cient and would not send out the right messages 
to insurers and their clients. They would lead to the 
selection of a sub-optimal level of protection in the 
economy. It should be noted that, in order for these 
transfers to be mutually proﬁ  table, it would not be 
necessary for the agents involved to be capable of 
managing these risks. It would sufﬁ  ce that the cost 
of their relative incompetence versus insurers and 
reinsurers not be higher than the gain that is to 
be had in terms of the valuation of the effects of 
diversiﬁ  cation and pooling thanks to risk transfer 
and securitisation. 
3|2 Financing  domestic  economies
Via the premiums that they invest, insurance and 
reinsurance companies play a fundamental role in 
ﬁ  nancing domestic economies. They ﬁ  nance a large 
portion of public debt and investment in corporate 
debt and equity instruments. In a country like 
France, households make 40% of their direct and 
indirect investments in equities via insurance and 
reinsurance.8 Similarly, households make 77% of 
their direct and indirect investments in corporate 
bonds  via insurance and reinsurance. Overall, 
French households make 60% of their investments in 
businesses via their insurance contracts, compared 
with only 25% via their mutual fund investments 
and 15% directly. These ﬁ   gures attest to the 
importance of insurance for household investment 
in the productive economy.
It is clear that, if insurers had to reduce their 
investments in equities, this would not be offset by 
a rise in other components, which include direct 
investment (21% of all household investments in 
equities) and investments in mutual funds (38% 
8  Estimate based on looking through mutual funds, at their original investments.ARTICLES
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of all household investments in equities). Neither 
the government nor businesses could hope to 
replace insurers. It would be necessary to increase 
the role of pension funds or foreign investors.
In countries like France, where pension funds are
quasi-inexistent, the ﬁ  rst alternative is not available. 
As for the second alternative, that of increasing 
the role of foreign investors, it is not indeﬁ  nitely 
extensible. Indeed, foreign investment already 
accounts for nearly half of all share ownership in 
France’s, an important psychological threshold 
for both citizens and foreign investors alike.
The consequences for the European economy,
which has a substantial need for equity capital, 
would be disastrous.
In fact, the market value valuation of equities runs 
the risk of dissuading insurers and reinsurers from 
investing sufﬁ  ciently in equities. As we have seen, 
ﬂ   uctuations in  market value should encourage 
insurers and reinsurers to unload their equity 
holdings when the capital markets are down. This 
is most unfortunate –particularly since, as we 
have seen, equities exhibit regression to the mean 
behaviour that should logically make them an 
attractive ownership option when the markets are 
bearish (unlike bonds, which exhibit a divergence 
from the mean). Since equity market depreciation 
is in general synchronised with situations of 
ﬁ  nancial stress for companies, the latter should 
also be encouraged by  fair value measurement 
considerations to under-weight equities in their 
own portfolios compared with what optimal
asset/liability management would suggest.
This is why it will be important that the prudential 
standards correct, insofar as possible, this effect 
of fair value accounting on the ownership of equities 
by insurers and reinsurers. From this perspective, 
the capital requirements on equities proposed 
today under Solvency II would only aggravate the 
situation, because they are excessive with respect to 
the capacity of insurers and reinsurers to hold these 
securities over periods sufﬁ  ciently long to hope to 
reap the beneﬁ  cial effects of their regression to the 
mean. The European Commission has proposed 
that the default stress level be determined for the 
equity risk on the basis of the volatility of equities 
over a one year horizon. Calculated on this basis, it 
would be 32% for listed equities and 45% for private 
equity. This level is problematic, not only because 
it would be very dissuasive with respect to equity 
ownership, but also because the reference to annual 
volatility is incorrect given the multi-year timeframe 
of the insurance liabilities that equities cover. The 
Solvency II draft runs the risk of reinforcing the 
distortions introduced by the notion of fair value on 
equity ownership by insurers and reinsurers.
It should be noted that, curiously, prudential 
standards have historically given preference to the 
hypothesis of a regression to the mean for bonds 
alone, even though empirical work highlights the 
opposite, i.e., divergent behaviour with respect to 
regression to the mean for bonds and regression to 
the mean behaviour for equities.
3|3 The  ﬁ  nancial stability
 of  economies
Insurance and reinsurance do not stop at just 
helping to ﬁ  nance the economy. They also play the 
role of shock absorption. By deﬁ  nition, they absorb 
the real shocks that they insure or reinsure, and 
some of these shocks may have a macroeconomic
dimension –such as major storms or cyclones, 
earthquakes, terrorist attacks and so on. The 
bulk of the shock inﬂ  icted by the attack on the
World Trade Center was absorbed by insurance and 
reinsurance, and it was the European companies 
that absorbed half of that shock, thereby helping to 
spread its impact globally. However, companies are 
also increasingly encouraged to transfer their risks 
to other actors, less well qualiﬁ  ed than they are to 
manage and absorb them. This is due not only to the 
inefﬁ  cient combination of existing accounting and 
prudential standards, but also to the emergence of a 
deeper and more liquid securitisation market, which 
offers an increasingly competitive alternative to the 
insurance and reinsurance companies.
But, as we have seen, the longer term horizon of 
insurance and reinsurance companies compared 
with other ﬁ  nancial services players such as banks, 
enables them to maintain depreciated/impaired 
assets in their portfolio that other investors might 
have a tendency to unload but that these companies 
will keep in their balance sheet whenever there is 
a potential for rebound, which is in particular the 
case for diversiﬁ  ed equity portfolios which exhibit 
regression to the mean behaviour. Unfortunately, we 
have also seen that the accounting standards in force 
throughout the world encourage short-term arbitrage ARTICLES
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on the part of insurers and reinsurers in ﬁ  nancial 
boom situations as far as historic cost accounting is 
concerned, and in ﬁ  nancial depression situations 
as far as fair value accounting is concerned, which 
prevents companies from fully playing their role of 
long-term investor role and shock absorber in the 
latter hypothesis.
In the interest of greater ﬁ  nancial stability, it is 
important that the shock absorption potential of 
insurance and reinsurance not be overlooked, and 
that the accounting and prudential standards be 
designed and articulated coherently, so that this 
potential can be realised. The stakes are high, 
because they concern the ability of the market to 
absorb shocks by itself, with minimum intervention 
on the part of public policymakers. Otherwise, 
ﬁ  scal and monetary policy will be solicited, at 
a much higher cost for taxpayers because these 
interventions are also a source of moral hazard 
in the economy. The importance lies less where 
this issue is taken into account –at the level
of accounting or solvency– and more with the 
fact that it be correctly valued in one of these two 
standards. Above all, it is vital that the two standards 
avoid aggregating the obstacles. As we have seen, it 
is likely that prudential standards have a particularly 
signiﬁ  cant role to play in this area.ARTICLES
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